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A model is developed for solving the optimization problem created
when a manufacturer presents management with numerous proposed modifica-
tions which will improve the system effectiveness of an existing system.
The optimization is constrained by the physical limitations of the system
and by a limited budget. System effectiveness is defined and discussed
in detail for an anti-submarine aircraft system with reliability consid-
ered the single most important factor. The model transforms the problem
into an integer programming problem, and a numerical example is provided
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rapidly growing sophistication and complexity of the weapons systems
in the military arsenal today has greatly increased the difficulty in
comparing different systems designed to perform similar missions and the
difficulty in optimizing weapons system effectiveness improvements within
one system. One such complex system, in need of some improvement, is the
Navy's P3-C Orion, an anti-submarine warfare aircraft.
In a complex electronics system, such as the P3-C, a major portion of
its system effectiveness is dependent on its reliability. Hence, a model
was sought that would he applicable to optimizing the reliability of a
system and, at the same time, that could be modified to include any other
factors in the measurement of system effectiveness.
This paper considers the problem which faces management if the manu-
facturer submits some 100-200 proposed modifications which will increase
the reliability or some capability of the system. Assuming there are
constraints on the budget available and weight increases allowed on and
volume available in the aircraft, the problem which management must solve
is defined as follows: maximize some measure of weapons system effective-
ness, subject to the budget, weight and volume constraints. The model
herein will help provide an answer for that problem.

II. WEAPONS SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
A measure of the effectiveness is the primary prerequisite before any
attempt can "be made to compare different systems or to consider improve-
ments within a single system. The most logical measure of effectiveness
for an anti-submarine system is how well can the system catch a submarine;
or, given a submarine is present, what is the probability that a crew in
the aircraft can successfully acquire, identify, localize and kill the
submarine within the aircraft's flight time capability.
A standard mission will be considered as two hours flight time to
station, eight hours on station, and two hours to return to base. The
target will be a standard, undefined submarine and an average crew, also
undefined, will be aboard the aircraft. Weapons system effectiveness
(henceforth WSE) is now defined as the probability that on a standard
mission an average crew is able to acquire, identify, localize and kill a
standard submarine successfully.
In order to state a precise formula for WSE, the following definitions
are necessary:
R Reliability of the aircraft, i.e., the probability that all re-
quired subsystems remain fully operational for the standard mission
time
A The probability that the equipment on board will acquire informa-
tion indicating a target is present, given that the aircraft remains
operational
I The probability that the information is sufficient to allow iden-
tification as a submarine, given the aircraft remains operational
L The probability that the submarine is localized accurately enough
that an attack may be made, given the aircraft remains operational
K The probability that an attack is successful, given the aircraft
remains operational
C Capability of the crew, i.e., the probability that the average
crew will successfully accomplish the above four portions of the

mission, given that the aircraft remains operational and given that
the equipment is successful in accomplishing the four portions of the
mission
Assuming that the four portions of the mission are independent, WSE
is defined as the product RxAxIxLxKxC. The problem which man-
agement must solve is:
Maximize: RxAxIxLxKxC
Subject to: 2Lcosts ($) ^ Budget (B)
^Weights (w) £ Weight Allowance (w)
XLVolumes (v) ^. Volume Allowance (V)
III. BASIC MODEL
Assume that the aircraft can be divided into 22 independent, separable
subsystems of which 15 are considered critical to the ASW mission.
Since the 15 critical subsystems all must function for the ASW mission to
be successful and since they are independent and separable, the reliabil-
ity of the system can be represented as a 15-component series system. It
will also be assumed, at this point, that the manufacturer has not pro-
posed any modifications which will improve the aircraft capabilities nor
are any proposed which will improve crew capability. Let R. be the re-
liability of the i critical subsystem, the objective function has
11
become IT R .
In order to solve even this reduced problem by conventional methods,
the entire probability function for all 15 critical subsystems would have
to be defined, and the various combinations of improvements tried. As the
number of proposed modifications increases, the number of possible com-
binations becomes rapidly unmanageable even for a computer. Therefore,
a more efficient method of solution is required. Define as follows:
•Mod (ij) Modification j to the i subsystem










Reliability of the i subsystem after modification j has been
made
Reliability of the system if one modification, Mod (ij), has
been made
RS . - RS Reliability increase from Mod (ij) per unit







































< 7, Ri > ( R'ab " V
i/a
15




Consider Mod (ab) which is a change to a component which must work in
order for its respective subsystem to work. The reliability of the sub-
system can be represented as a series system with two components: the
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The important result from Eq. 2 is that D. . is a function of the old
and new reliabilities of the component proposed for modification only.
Hence, for proposed modifications to components which must function for
the mission to be successful the D. ,*s are constants and are computed
simply by Eq. 2.
Next consider a component proposed for modification which is in par-
allel with one other component in its respective subsystem reliability
representation; i.e., either the component proposed for modification or
one other (or both) must work for the subsystem to work. The reliability











































The result is not quite as simple as Eq. 2j however, D. . still depends
on the component proposed for modification and the one in parallel with it
only. Similar equations may be derived for all cases where the component
being modified is in some form of parallel reliability operation with
other components. In all such cases, D. . is a function of the component
and the ones in parallel with it only. Furthermore, the D. ,'s will remain
constant throughout the optimization if there are no pairs of proposed
modifications involving components which are in some form of parallel
reliability operation with each other. This temporary restriction will be
eased later in section IV.
Consider an unconstrained maximization of reliability if only one
modification is allowed to be made. The modification which gave the
largest increase in reliability would be the one chosen. This modifica-
tion would also give the largest D. .. If only two modifications were
allowed, all combinations of two modifications would need to be tried in
10

order to find the pair which gave the largest increase in RS. However,
if the largest D. . were chosen, then the second largest D, . were chosen,
the modifications corresponding to the two D 's would also give the
largest increase in RS since D. . is a function of the increase in RS for
Mod (ij). This process would be the same as finding the maximum ^ D, .
given that only two were allowed to "be chosen. One can use simple induc-
tion to realize that for any given number, say n, of allowed changes to
be made that the same set of Mod (ij) would be chosen by either maximizing
RS or H Di ..
or
15
Maximize: RS TT R., Maximize: £__ D. .
i-1 is an 10
equivalent
Subject to: n modifications optimization Subject to: n mods
are allowed to to allowed
be made
Next consider the constrained problem which is to maximize the relia-
bility of the system subject to the budget, weight and volume restrictions.
c. . « $ cost of Mod (ij)
Lets w. . » weight cost of Mod (ij)
v. . volume cost of Mod (ij)




Subject to: £ c * * ^ B
Z>U £ w
* TU <£ V
the summations are over]
the set { ij | Mod (ij)
. is made}
Transforming the objective function into the D. . form and defining a
variable X . . - 1 if i'od (ij) is made to the system and X. . = if Mod (ij)
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Since algorithms already exist for computer solutions to integer pro-
gramming problems, this paper will not discuss integer programming
algorithms except to suggest that an applicable algorithm for this model
may be found in reference ( 1 )
.
«
IV. RESTRICTED BASIS ENTRY
A restricted basis entry rule will allow the restriction on modifica-
tions of components which are in some form of parallel reliability to be
removed. However, one extra variable will be necessary for each such pair





















Letting Mod (i1) be the modification to component one, Mod (i2) be the
modification to component two, and Mod (i3) be the modification correspond-
ing to the modifications of both components, the calculations for the
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A restricted basis entry rule will allow only one of the above three
modifications to be in the solution at any one time. For the dummy modi-
fication the costs would simply be the sums of the respective costs asso-
ciated with the two modifications which the dummy represents. If more
than two proposed modifications happen to be in parallel, a similar method
would be employed utilizing more dummy modifications to represent the
various combinations.
Another example which requires restricted entry is as follows: one
proposed modification would replace the entire radar transmitter-receiver
and antenna system, but there are also proposed modifications which only
affect one component of the old system. It is obvious that a contradic-
tion would exist if the modification which replaced the entire system and
any other modification to the old system were in the optimal solution at
the same time. The restricted basis entry rule would not allow contra-
dictory modifications in the set of optimal modifications. A further use
for restricted basis entry would be to disallow two (or more) modifications
to the same component to be in the optimal set.
13

V. MODIFICATIONS TO THE BASIC MODEL
A. SUBSYSTEM SEPARABILITY
It was originally assumed that the 15 critical subsystems were inde-
pendent and separable. Although independence among the failure times of
the components is a necessary assumption, the subsystems do not need to
be separable. If the components proposed for modification can be isolated
from their respective subsystems, then they can also be separated from the
entire system. Therefore, the system may be considered as a whole and the
33. *s may be calculated by merely isolating the components into their
simplest series reliability operation with the whole system. Hence the i
subscript, indicating the subsystem being modified, may be dropped and the
D, 's simply become D.'s. This will allow the model to be used for systems
which cannot be separated into separate subsystems.
B. REDUCED CAPABILITIES
Thus far only a system which is either working or failed has been con-
sidered. Whereas this simple model may be representative of a tank or an
amphibious landing craft, most more complicated weapons systems have sev-
eral reduced capability modes of operation in addition to a fully opera-
tional mode. Therefore, a redefinition of WSE is necessary in order to
include reduced capability modes of operation in this model.
First the several levels of operation must be defined. For this model,
three levels of operation will be considered in addition to the failed
mode: fully operational, secondary mode, and tertiary mode. The relia-
bility function must be developed for each level of operation. Only
pieces of equipment which, if failed, would cause the system to go into a
reduced capability mode should be considered; e.g., since the computer is
essential to all three modes of operation, it should be considered in the
14

reliability function of all three modes; whereas the failure of the inertial
navigation system will cause the system to be reduced to the secondary
mode, and hence should only be considered in the reliability function of
the fully operational mode.
Now the D.'s must be computed for each proposed modification from the
reliability functions of each mode of operation: e.g., there would be a
D1., D2. and D3 . computed for a modification to the computer, but only a
o o o
D1 . (D2. and D3. would be 0) for a modification to the inertial navigation
system.
Next, the four system capabilities, acquisition, identification, local-
ization and kill, must be determined for each mode.
Lastly, a weighting factor must be determined for each mode of opera-
tion which should be some measure of the probability of remaining in each
respective mode for the mission. These weightings should sum to- one. At
first glance it would appear as though the weightings would be merely the
reliability for the respective modes of operation, given the system does
not abort. However, if a piece of equipment which is essential to the
long-range navigation subsystem fails after the aircraft is on station,
the capability for catching the submarine has not really been affected.
Hence the method of determination of the weighting factors must be care-
fully considered by the manager. One possible set of weighting factors
would be as follows: W1 = probability of remaining fully operational for
at least half the mission given the system does not fail completely;
W2 = probability that the system is in the secondary mode of operation for
at least half the mission given that the system does not fail completely;
and W3 = 1 - (W1 + W2).
Define as follows:
Reliability of the system operating in




A1, 11, L1, K1~) Same as in the original description of WSE, but
A2, 12, L2, K2f reflecting the capabilities of the various levels
A3, 13, L3, K$J of operation
Same as previously, except to reflect the effect
of Mod (j) for the various levels of operation
Now:
WSE » (R1 x A1 x 11 x L1 x K1 x W1) + (R2 x A2 x 12 x L2 x K2 x W2)
+ (R3 x A3 x 13 x L3 x K3 x W3)
And the optimization becomes:
>: < X. (D1 . x W1 + D2,
Subject to: Same constraints
Maximize: 5" ,. 4 4 x W2 + D3 . x W3)
C. SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
In order to consider modifications which will improve the system
capabilities, the following questions must be considered:
1. Is there more than one type of mission?
2. If a new piece of equipment is added to the system, how will this
affect reliability?
3. Can system capability be measured accurately enough?
In considering various mission types, i.e., diesel submarine as opposed
to nuclear submarine as the target, the capabilities of the system should
be significantly different. Furthermore, if different equipment must be
used for different mission types, then the reliability function will be
different for the different mission types too. For this model two missions
will be considered Mission one and Mission two. It is assumed that the
probability of the system being tasked to a type one or a type two mission
are known.
M1 » Probability of type one mission
M2 =« Probability of type two mission = 1 - M1
16

j ml Defined as previotisly except to reflect the effect of
D.
m2J Mod (j) on a type one or two mission
The optimization becomes:
Maximize: J" X. (D. . x M1 + D. „ x M2)
J
If a completely new piece of equipment is introduced into the system,
in order to increase system capability, the effect on system reliability
must also be considered in the calculation of D . Two cases are consid-
J
ered: a replacement piece of equipment is put into the system which
improves capability and changes reliability; and a new piece of equipment
is added to the system replacing none but improving system capability.
If a modification replaces a component and changes system capability,
then D. will have more than one component. The D-value is first computed
for the reliability change (if reliability decreases then this D-value
will be negative). Next the D-value is computed for the change in the
system capability, acquisition, identification, localization or kill,
which is affected; and if more than one capability is affected, a D-value
is computed for each effect. D. is merely the sum of the D-values computed.
If a modification only adds a new piece of equipment, improving capa-
bility, D . is computed normally. However, an adjustment must be made to
J
the computed D, to reflect the reliability of the piece of equipment. For
example, if the reliability of the new piece of equipment were
.95 1 then
the D. used in the optimization should be .95 x D. as computed. The de-
J J
crease in the D . compensates for the fact that the increase in WSE from
this particular modification would only be realized 95$ of the time.
Care must be exercised before deciding to introduce system capabilities
into the model. As with crew capability, unless the measurements are of
17

the same degree of precision as the measurements of reliability, then in-
accuracies will he introduced into the optimization.
D. CREW CAPABILITIES
Introducing crew capability into the model is simple if, indeed, crew
capability can be measured, if meaningful modifications can be proposed
which will change crew capability, and if the change in crew capability
can be precisely measured. The problem of including crew capability in
the model thus becomes a problem in human factors. Assuming there is a
valid measure of "average" crew capability, one possible modification
might be to increase the training period for crew members. The increased
training should logically increase crew capability, but how much? If pre-
cise measurements are not possible, which they are not, it would be better
to consider modifications which affect crew capability and crew comfort
as a separate problem.
The D.'s as computed for reliability change are fairly precise quan-
J
titles as should the D.'s for modifications affecting system capability
J
be also, but the D.'s computed for crew capability modifications cannot
be precise. Therefore, crew capability modifications will not be con-
sidered in this model.
E. COMPLETE MODEL
The final model including reliability, system capabilities, two mis-
sion types, three levels of operational capability, but not including
crew capability, is as follows:
18

Weapon System Effectiveness (WSE)
(R1 a x A1 , x 11 , xL1 . xK1 4 x W1 x M1)v ml ml ml ml ml '
+ (E2 , x A2 , xI2 , xL2 , xK2 , xW2xM1)s ml ml nil ml ml '
+ ( R'
m1 * «., - «b1 « L' 1 * K'mi * »3 * Ml)
+ < R1B2
x A1
m2 x I1m2 * L1n2 * K1m2 * W1 * «>
+ l^' A2m2 x I2m2 X L2m2 x K2m2 * W2 x M2 >
+ ( R5„2 x A5m2 x I'm2 * L'm2 % K5m2 x " x «>
and the integer program is as follows:
Maximize: £ V X. 2 (D1 . x W1 + D2 . x W2 + D3, x W3)
j
j ° ml ° J j
-J
m2
Subject to: ^ X . x c . ^ B
j ° °
5~ X. x w. ^ WT
.
j °
H X, x v. ^ V
X. = 1 if Mod (j) is made




This model can be applied to any system whose effectiveness can be
precisely defined and determined. The most important requirement is that
the components which are proposed for modification are able to be isolated
into some form of series reliability with the rest of the system.
It will be required that the manufacturer provide the following in-
formation: Mod #, computed D., c, w., v., and any other Mod #'s which
J J J J
mny not be in the optinal set at the same time. See Table 6-1 for an
19

example of the information and suggested format. The D.'s should all be
J
positive , since a negative D . would indicate a change which would reduce
reliability or capability. The D.'s will be of a magnitude of .001 to .01.
The c.'s should all be positive; but the w 's and v.'s may be either neg-
ative or positive. For instance, a negative weight cost would imply that
the new component is lighter than the old one.
Although the budget constraint is self-explanatory, it should be con-
sidered the most flexible constraint. That is, although there may be a
specific amount of money set aside for improvement to a certain system,
no physical laws prevent more or less money from becoming available. Hence
a different set of optimal modifications may be found for several budget
levels.
It must be assumed that, since the manufacturer is suggesting the
modifications, they will all be individually feasible and able to be in-
corporated into the system. Considering an aircraft as the system to be
improved, it will be assumed that the volume constraint is a rigid one,
since only so much total physical space is available in which to place
components. The weight constraint will also be assumed to be rigid, even
though engineering safety limitations on maximum gross weight of an air-
craft do include a safety margin, thus possibly allowing some leeway.
B. AN EXAMPLE
The following problem is offered for illustrative purposes only.
Whereas it is considered typical of a problem such as has been discussed,
the example has been greatly simplified.
The system which is to be improved is a system with only one mission
type, has only two operating modes, operational and failed, and only one
system capability defined which is the probability of killing a target
20

given that the system remains operational. Crew capability is not con-
sidered. The additional weight allowance available is 15 units, and the
additional volume available is 65 units. It is assumed that the budget
available will be $34? however, management feels that several levels of
funding should be considered. Making the transformation to the integer
programming form, the problem may be defined as follows:
Maximize: 51 X. x D.
J J
Subject to: JT. X . x c . ^ B
£x. xw^ 4 15
The manufacturer's proposed modifications may be found in Table 6-1,
but no description is available. It should be noted that Mod (2) is in
parallel with Mod (3) and a dummy modification, Mod (6), ha3 been intro-
duced. Note also that Mod (1) has a negative weight cost. Prior to a
computer solution utilizing an integer programming algorithm, certain
properties of the problem can be analyzed to determine whether or not com-
puter techniques are necessary and to determine whether or not all the
constraints are necessary. By dividing D . by c . the marginal dollar ef-
fectiveness of Mod (j) may be computed. The marginal weight effectiveness
and marginal volume effectiveness for Mod ( j) may also be computed. The






• Yc j Vwj Vtj
1 .0020 1 -2.0 5 .002 -.001 .0004
2 .0030 5 1.0 5 .0006 .003 .0006
3 .0036 12 2.0 12 .0003 .0003 .0003
4 .0044 4 .4 4 .0011 .011 .0011
5 .0050 10 2.5 5 .0002 .002 .001
6 .0051 17 3.0 17 .0003 .0017 .0003
7 .0052 13 .4 4 .0004 .013 .0013
8 .0052 4 .2 13 .0013 .026 .0004
9 .0056 8 .7 7 .0007 .008 .0008
10 .0060 5 3.0 2 .0012 .002 .003
11 .0060 12 1.5 6 .0005 .004 .001
12 .0063 7 2.0 9 .0009 .0031 .0007
13 .OO64 8 4.0 16 .0008 .0016 .0004
14 .0080 2 0.0 2 .004 undef .004
15 .0150 3 6.0 5 .005 .0025 .003






Ordering the modifications in decreasing order of marginal dollar
effectiveness and considering that the modifications are made in that or-
der will generate the table in Table 6-2. Similar tables may also be
generated for marginal weight effectiveness and for marginal volume ef-
fectiveness. Since the constraints on weight and volume are assumed to be
rigid, it is obvious that for any budget not greater than $42, the optimal




Subject to: c. •£ B
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Total Dollar Total Yfeight Total Volume
Mod # Cost Cost Cost
15 3 6 5
14 5 6 7
1 6 4 12
8 10 4.2 25
10 15 7.2 27
4 19 7.6 31
12 26 9.6 40
13 34 13.6 56
9 42 14.3 63
2 47 15.3 68
11 59 16.8 74
7 72 17.2 78
5 82 19.7 83
6 94 21.7 95
Table 6-2. Ordered Marginal Dollar Effectiveness
From a similar set of tables for ordered marginal weight and volume
effectiveness tables, it can be shown that, for any budget of $73 or
greater, the budget constraint is no longer really a constraint; or in
other words, that for the rigid weight constraint of 15 and volume con-
straint of 65 a budget constraint of at least $73 will never be violated
even if the optimization were not to consider dollar costs.
C. SUMMARY
Summarizing the insight gained from the example, it has been shown
that for a budget of $42 or less that the optimization problem is a one-
constraint problem and can be done simply by hand. For a budget of $73
23

or greater, the optimization is reduced to a two-constraint problem which
greatly reduces the time required to solve "by integer programming methods.
Hence, only for budget values between $42 and $73 must all three constraints
be considered.
In an actual problem, it might be the case that either the weight con-
straint or the volume constraint might be so restrictive that the other
might not need to be considered; or it might be the case that either con-
straint might be so loose that it need not be considered as a real con-
straint. For example, if the volume constraint in the example problem
were relaxed to 75 $ it would no longer be a real constraint for the weight
constraint of 15 and the given set of modifications. Conversely, if the
volume constraint were tightened to 57 for the same weight constraint of
15 and the same set of modifications, then the weight constraint would no
longer be a real constraint to the optimization.
This method of constraint analysis is simple to perform for this model,
and the amount of work required of the computer to compute optimal sets of
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